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KEYNOTE SPEECH
INTERACTIONS OF CLASSROOM, LAW
OFFICE, AND MARKETPLACE: BEARINGS ON
PROFESSIONALISM
VICTOR

G.

ROSENBLUM*

President Schnabel, Dean Bodensteiner, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and
Gentlemen:
It is a happy privilege to participate in the dedication of the new Wesemann Hall. Valparaiso has had a long and honorable tradition in legal education commencing with its founding of the School of Law in 1879, and
enhanced by its approval by the American Bar Association in 1929 and its
acceptance for membership in the Association of American Law Schools in
1930.
A fellow educator cannot help but take pride in your dedicated faculty,
in the quality of the student body and the curriculum, in the contributions
to the profession of your distinguished alumni, and in your placing the new
library with its multiple accessible assets at the heart of the building. In
addition to the impressiveness of these achievements, you warrant high
praise for your insistence in your statements of what you look for in applicants that "law school requires a great deal more than mere academic ability. Law school requires maturity, integrity, dedication, and common
sense." From personal visitation, I have seen in action your commitment
drawn from religious belief in love of God and love of neighbor to have "a
diverse student body whose members represent the wide variety of social,
economic, ethnic, and religious backgrounds found in our society." We are
at our best as legal educators when we manifest the pluralistic strengths of
a society enriched by diversity. Your construction of a superb new facility
for legal education for such a diverse student body reaffirms recognition of
the primacy of the rule of law and of equal access to it in a democratic
society.
*

President, Association of American Law Schools; Professor of Law, Northwestern

University School of Law.
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In each passing day's events we find compelling reminders that law is
the primary alternative instrument for dispute resolution. It is the alternative to violence, blood-feud, and chaos. As the inscriptions on the front and
back of the United States Supreme Court building symbolize, "equal justice under law" and "justice the guardian of liberty" make feasible the displacement of individual and collective wars in confronting disputes with
utilization of and adherence to legal norms, processes, and institutions the instruments of democratic governance, accountability, and peace.
Courses, seminars, and clinics are convened here to analyze, advocate,
critique, and challenge the legal order's cases, problems, processes, organizations, and actions. You probe and prod, toast, and roast the delineation of
doctrines, theories, facts, fables, and foibles in the law's quest for truth and
justice.
As regards the case method of instruction, without being a card-carrying Langdellian, I continue to view the case approach as a practicable and
essential vehicle for learning about and improving the law. Of course, what
are sometimes alleged to be cases and materials on a certain subject can
turn out to be disembodied, disemboweled skeletons of human and societal
realities, leaving students and professors to conjecture about meretricious
and penumbral rather than genuine and core features of cases. Those are
occasional defects in implementation rather than of generic defects in conception and potential of the case method.
Last month, in the course of an Association of American Law Schools'
conference on clinical legal education in San Antonio, at which Valparaiso
was well represented, I enjoyed a musical spoof of the case method of instruction performed by talented clinicians toward the end of an otherwise
serious and stimulating program. Entitled 2010: A Clinical Odyssey, the
show dealt with an all clinically operated law school to which a last-surviving adherent to the case method of instruction comes beseeching employment. To the tune of Those Were the Days, the lonely case method protagonist bleated:
We liked our reign of terror when
Classes were Socratic and students were men
We can show we really rate
When obscure points we illuminate
Showing how some footnote errs
Convincing us that we're great.

...

Although it should in no sense monopolize the law school curriculum, the
case method, with all of its flaws, has yet to be surpassed, in my opinion,
when it comes to capacity to demand and evoke critical, analytical thought
and moral evaluation in dealing with the nature, complexity, and instrumentation of the command, "Justice, Justice shall ye do." Great cases such
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss3/7
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as Marbury v. Madison, Palsgrafv. The Long Island Railroad, Sweatt v.
Painter, Chadha v. The Immigration and NaturalizationService, Palmore
v. Sidotti, and many others you and I might include, require us to focus on
living relationships among legal norms and human deeds. Facts, motives,
actions, confluences, reasonableness, proximateness, foreseeability, relevance, materiality, ethicality, and morality must be examined - not as impersonal propositions or aggregate data but as pertaining to and affecting
the lives, capacities, and fortunes of identifiable persons.
Lawyers and legal educators no doubt derive satisfactions and jollies
from debates over methodologies of instruction. But the most perplexing
problems for our profession today are not tied to how we teach. Educational
methodologies nationally, as well as at Valparaiso, are better and more effectively oriented than ever toward professional and skills training. To me
the core problems are tied to what we teach, to the messages we convey via
commission and omission to our students.
An essential element of what we teach is a focus on the rule of law, on
law's availability to all, and on the accountability of all to the law; this is in
essence a focus on a government of laws and not of men, as the framers put
it. We are grateful to the framers of our Constitution for their originality,
candor, and subtlety in articulating a system of effective and accountable
governance. At the core of the system they developed lay distrust of undue
power and of individual wielders of that power. Combined with this distrust
was the realization that power to govern was as necessary as it was potentially abusive. How were the framers to achieve the necessity yet control the
abuse?
Their eloquent prescription was summarized by Alexander Hamilton,
James Madison, and John Jay in Number 51 of the FederalistPapers:
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of
the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the
place. It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices
should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But
what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on
human nature? If men were angels, no government would be
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor
internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing
a government which is to be administered by men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government
to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control
itself.
Aside from its tone of male chauvinism, that prescription is a timeless reminder of both objective and need in conducting the public's business.
The framers were not so naive as to believe that good intentions proProduced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1988
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duce good deeds. The ability of the government to perform its necessary
functions hinges not simply on having sufficient power to control its subjects
but is dependent as well on ability and incentive to restrain itself within its
proper sphere. Time and again we have learned that controls over government are as essential to effective democratic rule as are controls in behalf of
the public interest by government.
By seeking to separate impulse to take action from the opportunity to
carry it out, and by pluralizing initiatives as well as constraints through the
separation of powers and checks and balances, the framers endeavored to
energize capacity for effective action while controlling potentiality for
abuse. One branch's ambition could be countered by the ambitions of the
others. In such a system, pride, rather than weakness, attaches to the reigning in of governmental excess; it is when government denies to itself power
to abuse power that it meets the acid test of responsibility.
As members of the bar and as educators of future members, we have a
special role to play in meeting that acid test. Our professional skills must be
available to monitor and constrain the uses of power and to maximize the
accessibility of redress. How do we rate in performing this role?
In a speech at the University of Chicago two years ago, Justice Rehnquist criticized lawyers for being more interested in billing than in statecraft. Contrasting today's era with times when the profession gave the
country such leaders as Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln, Justice
Rehnquist observed that "[f]aw is surely a more profitable profession for
those who practice it now than it was then, but one cannot help doubting
whether its contribution to the political life of the nation has not been sadly
diminished in the process." He was especially critical of us for "squeezing
out" in the course of making law a paying proposition, "like any mass production effort does, the little diversities the profession would better tolerate." He noted with dismay recent transformation, especially in lawyers'
roles in political campaigns, of "forensic battles into marketing events."
Legal educators must acknowledge that transformations from forensic
battles into marketing events neither began with nor are confined to political campaigns when it comes to diminution of our professional stature. The
hiring season for law students by law firms has shifted emphasis in many
instances from probes of ability to prescriptions for dressing for success,
and for psyching out interviewers to tell them what they want to hear
rather than what the job applicant can and wants to do.
Moreover, we faculty members have at times succumbed to or abetted
the marketing event syndrome. I noted in a talk in January at the AALS
Convention corrosion of educational and professional values by our responses to some recruitment practices. Notwithstanding our insistence that
preparation for and performance in courses to the best of one's ability are
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss3/7

Rosenblum: Interactions of Classroom, Law Office, and Marketplace: Bearings

1988]

BEARINGS ON PROFESSIONALISM

as much hallmarks of the professional responsibility of emerging lawyers as
are preparation for and performance at trial, we often "excuse" students on
myriad "callbacks" for prospective jobs from their course preparation and
participation. The fault lies not so much with the existence of the marketplace, which is a vital and functional manifestation of a free society, but
with the response by legal educators to it. I would like to reiterate that
however indirect the effect may seem to be, law faculty members who condone absences or accept less than students' best in class in order to accommodate to demands of the marketplace, are teaching and practicing the
subordination of professional responsibility to fiscal values. Law firms and
law schools need to refine and reform approaches and responses to recruitment so as to restore and enhance their confluence with the professional
goals, responsibilities, and needs of legal education.
Although it did not address relationships between lawyer recruitment
and professionalism directly, the Stanley Commission on Professionalism of
the American Bar Association, in an instructive but unencouraging report
issued last August, issued caveats regarding subordination of professionals
to economic or market values which were entirely compatible with this concern. In the introduction to its report, the Stanley Commission posed the
key question: "Has our profession abandoned principal for profit, professionalism for commercialism?" Justin Stanley and his colleagues never
quite answer the question frontally, but their admonitions suggest that there
is far more than a scintilla of support for a "yes" answer.
At several points in the body of the report, the commission called upon
the profession to "resist the temptation to make the acquisition of wealth a
primary goal of law practice." Toward the end of the report, the commission stressed that "[a]ctivities directed primarily to the pursuit of wealth
will ultimately prove both self-destructive and destructive of the fabric of
trust between clients and lawyers generally."
My good friend and fellow law teacher, Professor Harold Levinson of
Vanderbilt University, recently commented in somewhat negative fashion
on the commission's admonitions against acquisition of wealth as a primary
goal of law practice. In a carefully crafted statement last month to the
ABA's Special Coordinating Committee on Professionalism, which was established to follow up and facilitate implementation of the Stanley Commission's Report, Professor Levinson stated:
The Commission urges lawyers to "resist the temptation to
make the acquisition of wealth the primary goal of law practice." I find this proposal unconvincing for a number of reasons.
First, I have no interest in the goals - whether primary or not
-

of lawyers. I care about their conduct -

specifically, the

manner in which their conduct fulfills their duties to client, to
profession, and to society. Second, any attempt to inhibit the
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1988
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ambition of lawyers to acquire wealth is naive and, arguably,
incompatible with some basic assumptions of our free enterprise
system. Third, I have no interest in the income level of lawyers,
either when expressed in terms of statistical averages or when
revealed in connection with specific law firms or individuals.
Thus the statistics about the income levels of lawyers (Report,
pp. 8-9), even if factually reliable, seem irrelevant. In order to
take a realistic approach, we should acknowledge that today's
law firm is a business, and that its owners are entitled to maximize their income from it, provided they remain within the
bounds of professionalism.
I do not disagree often with Professor Levinson's finely-honed insights
and comments, but I dissent on this occasion. The hallmark of the legal
profession is not that it is a business. In my view the Stanley Commission
was impeccably correct in its concerns and recommendations about the
bearing on professionalism of the generation of wealth as the primary drive
or goal. The fiduciary and officer-of-the-court dimensions of lawyers' roles
are subordinated if not abandoned by conceptualizing law practice as a business. There is nothing wrong with earning a decent and substantial living
as an accompaniment or collateral phenomenon to membership in the legal
profession; but the professed goal of "equal justice under law" suffers, withers, or is Ramboed away when the generation of wealth assumes dominance
over lawyers' choices and actions.
Carried to the logical economic extreme, lawyers' preoccupation with
the generation of wealth leads to leaving the law for places like Wall Street
investment banking houses, as Tamar Lewin's depressing article in the New
York Times Magazine in August, 1986, made clear. Among many of "the
best and the brightest" she interviewed for The Faster Track, the law was
seen increasingly "as technicians' work, neither entrepreneurial enough nor
remunerative enough to satisfy ambitious young professionals." As one lawyer who abandoned law offices and courthouses for investment banking put
it: "Your lawyer is your safety valve and that is still an important function,
but it's not where the action is."
If serving the legal needs of the people and seeking to improve the
fairness and efficiency of our system of justice is not "where the action is,"
something is rotten in the state of legal education, or at least in its inputs
and outputs.
Attitudes and practices that denigrate the core functions of the legal
professional fuel our critics. I am still smarting from charges by Doug
Bandow of the Cato Institute, who in a column on the New York Times'
op-ed page on March 15 of this year described the American Bar Association as "the prime guardian of lawyers' economic interests for a century"
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss3/7
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and charged the legal profession with having "consistently worked to make
it as difficult as possible for people to become lawyers" as part of the "brazenness with which the organized bar uses the system to enrich itself."
Professor Levinson calls appropriately on the legal profession to "recognize and refine our special duties to society"; yet he does not quite see
that those "special duties" may be bypassed, if not purged, by dominance of
the wealth motif over our profession.
Just this week I received a letter from the Dean of a major eastern law
school urging law teachers to address "the over-commercialization of the
profession" and its consequences. There are major changes in values and
structures of the profession, he insisted, that warrant serious immediate discussion. "Despite the growth of the skills training movement in law schools,
legal education may be further removed from the issues facing the profession than at any other time in history," he continued. Among the ongoing
changes compelling attention that he cited were:
the spectacular growth of the mega-firms, the internationalization of law practice, the overt basing of fees on the size and
success of the transaction, a money-driven system of law firm
management whereby the best and the brightest of our law
school graduates seem inevitably drawn into a structure that
places the highest premium on a total commitment of time and
effort to serve the interests of a very narrow slice of our society,
the pressures of this structure on family life, particularly as it
affects women, the widening gulf that many persons see between
the research interests of faculties and the concerns of the practicing bar, [and] the effect of high law firm starting salaries on
the teaching profession and legal education generally.
The legal education community must address earnestly and urgently such
issues relating to the changing structure of the profession, a subject which
at present "is not even an orphan, it is a homeless waif."
What this distinguished Dean urges compellingly in 1987, Frances
Zemans and I touched upon several years ago in The Making of a Public
Profession- the need for legal education to focus not only on the technical
skills of the profession but also upon the societal and moral roles and impacts of the law and the lawyer in practice. We concluded that "the notion
that the law is a purely technical enterprise is simply inconsistent with the
complex intertwining of law and social norms in any society, and most assuredly in a democratic one." We maintained that moral and ethical issues
can and should be integrated into traditional courses and not confined to
the "Professional Responsibility" class. Beyond that, I would like to see
implemented further a proposal to correlate pre- and post-enrollment plans
and attitudes of our students.
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1988
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Students applying to virtually any law school are required to write a
short essay on "why you are seeking a legal education, including information on your career plans" (the quote is from Northwestern's application,
which is typical), but I am not aware of systematic efforts by schools to
confront students before graduation with relationships between their stated
reasons for becoming lawyers and actual career choices being made. Of
course, market factors can furnish dramatic explanations at times for dichotomies between intention and action, but we should not assume or justify market sovereignty over every choice. Nor am I suggesting that a student does not have the right to change his or her mind between enrollment
and graduation. My prime point is that intellectual confrontation over and
explanation of relationships between declared aspirations and career decisions would provide informative data on the realities of legal education's
impact on lawyers' values, pressures, and choices and on the availability to
the general public of the services of competent professionals at a reasonable
cost in the future.
Although it would not alone cure any of the ailments of the legal profession, and although there are other Supreme Court decisions that I would
urge be reversed ahead of this one, I would like to see the Burger Court's
ruling in Gertz v. Welch reconsidered and revised. The Court ruled thirteen
years ago that we are merely "private figures" when we practice law. That
decision allows us to recover in defamation cases more easily than media or
sports celebrities or public officials. We neither needed that ruling nor
gained in esteem from it, for I believe we are and should be recognized as
public figures with public obligations as we practice and teach law. While
there is nothing wrong with our sharing in rewards of the marketplace,
there is very much wrong, as Justice Rehnquist stressed in his critique, with
our transmuting legal events into marketing events. Such transmutation is
facilitated by labeling as "private" figures the members of a public
profession.
The problems and concerns I have discussed are receiving attention
and have key places on the agendas of the American Bar Association, the
Association of American Law Schools, and other leading legal entities.
There are no immediate panaceas in sight, but incremental improvements,
at least, are on line. A soon to be issued report and recommendations of the
Joint AALS/NALP (National Association of Law .Placement) Committee
on Placement will propose approaches and programs that can alleviate
placement crunch. Additionally, the ABA's Special Coordinating Committee on Professionalism is working steadily toward implementation of the
Stanley Commission Report. I am hopeful that the forthcoming AALS
Convention will consider these and other proposals for enhancing our professionalism and the public's perceptions of us.
For contextual support in endeavors to bring our profession closer to
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol22/iss3/7
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achieving nationwide reality for "equal justice under law," I would recommend a recent article by my colleague, Professor Robert P. Burns, entitled
A Lawyer's Truth: Notes for a Moral Philosophy of Litigation Practice in
the Journal of Law and Religion. Arguing that a disposition toward factual
truth lies at the very core of moral personhood, Professor Burns concludes
that legal ethics must inquire into "what kind of a person am I to be and
what kind of person I make myself by engaging in the practice of law." I
know that the Valparaiso faculty and curriculum pose and probe such issues with sensitivity and rigor, while at the same time developing the skills
essential to responsible and successful law practice. In this beautiful and
imposing new Wesemann Hall, the probes, debates, and relentless quests
for truth and justice will surely flourish in an ambiance of professional skills
and caring.
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